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Abstract: The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) was first enacted in 2004 and revised in 2017. It offers 
standards for ethical and decent practices in the corporates. Law in Jordan in 2009 has enforced the formation of an audit 
committee for all listed companies. Literature has substantiated that the audit committee characteristic (ACCs) impact the 
quality of financial reporting. This work investigates the role of ACCs in lessening the prospect of corporates in obtaining 
modified audit opinion in the context of Jordan. Four ACC problems (expertise, independent, meeting, and size) have been 
studied and the modified audit opinion. The total sample of 117 listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was 
studied. The relationship between the modified audit opinions (dependent variable), and ACCs (expertise, independent, 
meeting, and size; as independent variables) was analyzed using logistic regression. The ACCs is projected to effectively 
improve the quality of financial reporting, and thus, decrease the prospect of corporate in obtaining modified audit opinion. 
The findings according to the listed companies from 2012 to 2017 in Jordan showed that audit committee (AC) expertise 
validates this likelihood. Lastly, there is no effect of AC independent, size, and the number of meetings held on the modified 
audit opinion. General, the findings have policy implications on enhancing corporate governance (CG) efficacy concerning the 
quality of financial reporting. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the disastrous and tragic impact of corporate 
scandals and crises that result in failure of giant firms, for 
example, Enron, WorldCom, etc. had a shocking influence on 
the quality of financial reports [1-3]. Many groups have 
called for the enhancement of CG practices. In line with this, 
there are four significant CG mechanisms e.g. AC, boards of 
directors (BoDs), internal and external audit roles that are 
directly involved in this matter [4]. The AC, management, 
and external auditor have distinctive functions in financial 
reporting. For instance, the BoDs has a critical function in 
guaranteeing the quality of financial statements of firms’ 
practices [5]. This is because the management is in charge of 
formulating the financial reports [6, 7], creating and 
sustaining sufficient internal control above the financial 
reporting [8]. Hence, the AC’s key responsibility is 
monitoring the process of financial reporting to safeguard 
ethical and decent financial statement by the managers on 
firm performance. This is along with supervising the 
efficiency of internal controls, and activities of external 
auditors [9]. It boosts the BoDs (principals) capability to act 
as a management supervisor by offering more comprehensive 
knowledge and insight for financial reporting [10]. 
The external audit functions act as a supervising 
instrument to safeguard the quality of financial information. 
Hence, the external auditor is taken as a fundamental aspect 
of the CG structure [11, 12]. Further, the external auditors are 
deemed as overseers, because they build a repute only by 
offering an independent authentication of the financial 
reports organized by company management. Whereas the 
external independent auditor is liable for expressing opinions 
on the fairground based on what financial reports show. Also, 
in line with all measurable terms in compliance with 
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Accounting Principles Generally Accepted [GAAP; 13]. 
Consequently, when the AC is characterized by expediting 
the labor of the external auditor, then the auditor’s opinion 
regarding the financial reports should be enriched [14]. This 
should be developed from a qualified opinion to a positive 
one, or generate certain reforms to the qualities and 
recommendations [15]. Thus, the AC must work with 
management and the external independent auditor to obtain 
the knowledge needed to deliver appropriate supervision of 
the process of financial reporting. Moreover, the AC is 
responsible for supervising the whole process of financial 
reporting [4, 16, 17]. In order to successfully achieve this, the 
AC must familiarize with the practices and controls that 
management has instituted to ascertain whether they were 
planned efficiently. 
The AC is regarded as one of the components in-charge of 
monitoring the shareholders’ interests and financial reports 
[18]. This may be due to the fact the main task of the AC is 
monitoring the practice of financial statements and control. 
In order to safeguard the veracity of its practices of financial 
reporting and the auditing process [19]. Literature has 
indicated that ACCs impacts the quality of financial reporting 
[20, 16, 21, 7, 22, 23]. Consistent with Salehi & Shirazi, [21] 
and Bajra & Čadež, [7] who revealed that ACCs are 
positively linked with the quality of financial reporting. The 
efficacy of corporate AC in monitoring the financial 
reporting practice relies on the independence of AC members 
[1] accounting and financial expertise [20, 24, 23], the 
number of meetings held [15] and size of AC [25]. 
The configuration of AC is less strict in Jordan compared 
to developed nations [26, 27]. Furthermore, in 2004, 
instituting ACs became obligatory for corporates listed in the 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC). Accordingly, ACs are 
remained the latest form of CG to be used in Jordan in line 
with JCGC (2017) which form ACs which stated that ACs 
should consist of three non-executive members, and at least 
two must be independent members who have no relationship 
with the corporate. In such that, they will not meddle with the 
application of their independence on the management and the 
firm, and one among them must chair the committee. There 
are about 248 number of public shareholding corporates in 
Jordan in practice, who are all mandated to form ACs. A 
contemporary survey by the investigator regarding firms that 
have listed their AC with the JSC the finding indicates 85% 
of the total companies who had done so. Nevertheless, there 
is a scarce of knowledge about the real functions of AC in 
these firms. AC not only plays a vital supervising role but 
also ensures the quality of financial statements and company 
accountability [28]. Disappointingly, AC in Jordan are 
commonly created to meet the requirements and standards of 
the regulations instead of having an indispensable role in 
sustaining the accuracy and reliability of the financial 
reporting scheme [29-32], this study is taking these aspect 
considerations. 
Conversely, compliant accruals are an indirect 
determination of the quality of financial reporting. The audit 
opinion is an appropriate indicator for the quality of financial 
reporting [33]. Consistent with Farinha & Viana, [5] issuing 
of a modified opinion by an external auditor is regarded as a 
sign of the poorer quality of financial reporting. Yet, there are 
very scarce studies, which reported the modified audit 
opinions as an aspect of quality of financial reporting. Only 
countable scholars employ audit opinion as a substitute for 
the quality of financial reporting [5, 34, 35]. Other studies 
have employed the audit opinion as a proxy for the quality of 
financial reporting [35-38, 5]. 
Likewise, studies have explored the characteristics of AC 
(independence, meetings, and size) on the modified audit 
opinion [38, 35]. However, these studies have overlooked the 
significance of other characteristics such as AC expertise, 
this is because the success of AC involves aggregate of 
characteristics [39]. In such that efficacy of one mechanism 
depends on the success of others. These tools function as 
complementary to each other in safeguarding the 
stakeholders’ interests and improve the quality of financial 
statements [40, 41]. Despite various literature on ACCs, but 
little is known about either its role in reducing the attitude of 
the firm to obtain the modified audit opinion and improving 
quality of financial reporting or its involvement in 
developing countries, for instance, Jordan, where CG is poor 
[39, 42, 14]. 
The present study aims at filling these research gaps, and it is 
significant to explore this crucial issue employing a more current 
sample. Literature has shown that ACCs affect the quality of 
financial reporting, proxy through earning management [20, 16, 
6, 7, 17]. 
 In this paper, the impact of the ACCs on the modified auditor 
opinion (MAO) in Jordan is investigated exploring the 
relationship between the ACCs (expertise, independent, 
meeting, and size) and the provision of MAO among listed 
corporates in Jordan. This present investigation encompasses the 
study on quality of financial reporting utilizing audit opinion as 
a determination for the quality of financial reporting and 
assesses its correlation with ACCs. 
Furthermore, this study adds to the pool of knowledge in 
various ways. One, it fills the gap about the influence of 
ACCs on modified audit opinion in Jordan. Two, it offers the 
policymakers with empirical data and vital information 
regarding ACCs activities and factors that influence such 
activities in Jordan in connection to MAO. Three, it provides 
researchers, policymakers, and the public with information 
financial reporting standards in correlation with the provision of 
MAO among listed corporates in Jordan. Four, it offers 
direction and support for components of companies and 
policymakers regarding their relative significance in 
safeguarding the quality of financial statements through 
ACCs. Five, it is one of the first studies to address the 
relationship between AC and modified audit opinion (in term 
of proxy on quality of financial reporting) in Jordan, Six, it 
offers an empirical suggestion on the efficacy of the AC to 
enrich the quality of CG. To the best knowledge of the 
current researcher, this work symbolizes the first attempt to 
investigate the relationship between ACCs and modified 
audit opinion in a developing economy. The findings have 
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policy inferences in enhancing CG efficacy and success 
concerning quality financial statements. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
2.1. Contextual Auditor's Reporting in Jordan 
Audit statements reporting do internal or external auditors 
to update the public regarding their auditing activities [11] 
utilize utmost communication instrument. Hence, auditor’s 
reporting is a prospective way to validate the authenticity and 
accessibility of financial facts [43]. Thus, an audit opinion is 
the financial report that conveys the assessment of 
independent auditors to their employers or consumers as an 
outcome of their investigation [44]. The audit opinion is very 
crucial because it informs the shareholders or investors on 
the real situations of matters on a corporate through the 
financial statements on whether the facts are reliable or not 
[45]. It as well indirectly updates to the clients of financial 
reports how the reliable and honest are the top board 
management [46]. 
AL-Thuneibat, [47] described the content of the auditor’s 
statement as a financial detail or testimony which 
encompasses several values and suggestions that can be 
trusted, accepted, and applied to make various financial 
decisions. Also, the facts containing in the auditor’s 
statement can offer a valuable contribution to the client’s 
analysis of the financial reports during decision-making on 
the economy. Additionally, the audit statement can 
encompass practical facts concerning the corporate’s 
capability to maintain its activity. Based on corporate law in 
Jordan for all listed firms on the ASE were required to 
submit financial reports from the external auditors. This is 
displays the impartiality of financial statements by corporates 
in conveying their operating outcomes and its financial 
status. The 1997 corporate law article no. 196 mandated the 
following information must be incorporated in the company 
auditors’ reports; 
That the auditor has obtained the knowledge, statements, 
and explanations he considered indispensable to execute his 
responsibility. 
That the corporate must upholds structured accounts 
registers and official papers. Its financial reports must be 
organized in conformity with the global standard of 
accounting and auditing codes which can rightly display the 
financial status of the company, its cash flow, balance sheet, 
and profit and loss account conform to the records and books. 
That the auditing processes conducted by the auditor for 
the corporate accounts, form in his opinion, a satisfactory 
realistic basis to convey his opinion concerning the corporate 
financial situation, outcomes of its processes, and cash flow 
in compliance with international standard auditing rules. 
That the financial reports included in the board of 
director’s statement forwarded to the general meeting comply 
with the corporate records and registers. 
There are two key classes of opinions in Jordan: modified 
(qualified) and unmodified (unqualified) audit opinions. The 
modified audit opinion is divided into four subclasses: 
Unqualified with an explanatory paragraph 
Qualified opinion reports 
Disclaimer of opinion reports 
Adverse opinion reports 
Based on the corporates’ law 22/1997 /article (195/b), 
following this categorization above, the external auditor must 
provide an opinion on the firm’s financial reports on one of 
the subsequent ways: 
Absolute approval (unmodified /unqualified opinion), 
Approval with reserve (modified/qualified opinion) 
however the auditor must specify the details for such a 
reservation and its financial consequence on the firm, 
Non-approval (adverse or disclaimer opinion), the auditor 
must return the financial reports to the firm's board of 
directors with the explanations that justify the rejection. 
2.2. Independence of Audit Committee 
Independence AC indicates the degree to which the AC is 
not under the control of corporate management [48]. When 
the AC is largely colonized by board members, the financial 
statement can be at risk of unfairness or partiality [7]. Thus, 
Bronson et al. [1] and DeFond and Francis [49] revealed that 
the implicit benefit of enhanced AC independence sprout 
from the belief that independent directors are better overseers 
of management than internal directors. This is to guarantee 
that ACs supply adequate supervision over the auditing 
practice and quality of financial statement [48]. According to 
this squabble, earlier study shows that AC independence is 
positively associated with effectual supervision of the 
process of financial reporting [1]. According to the agency 
theory perspective, an independent AC can solve the agency 
issue and lessen its costs [50]. The efficacy of the AC pivots 
on the level of its independence [1, 51]. Other scholars who 
established a link between a higher quality of financial 
reporting and AC independence [51] reinforce this argument. 
AC independence is deemed critical in supervising the 
quality of the financial report [16]. Apart from this, earlier 
study shows that ACs with independent members in boards 
of directors are more successful safeguarding the auditor’s 
independence [52, 15]. In accordance with Hayes, [53] and 
Bajra & Čadež, [7] demonstrated that the independence is 
preferred from the financial statement opinion since 
independent members are more expected to convey a fair 
opinion regarding financial reporting practices compared to 
dependent members. 
It seems that negligible empirical study on the correlation 
between the independent of AC and modified audit opinion 
has been published so far (at least to the best knowledge of 
this investigator). De Vlaminck & Sarens [16] depicts that 
AC independence is positively and significantly associated 
with quality of the financial report, whereas, Chen & Zhang, 
[51] shows that negative association between earnings 
management and the AC independence. Moreover, Pucheta-
Martínez & de Fuentes [38] discover that AC independence 
is a negatively significant relationship at the 10% level with 
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the reforms of audit opinion for noncompliance with GAAP. 
Antagonistically, this study did not discover any correlation 
between AC independence and quality of financial reporting 
[54, 4, 15, 9]. 
However, the relationship between AC independence and 
modified audit opinion in Jordan remains unclear. The JCGC 
(2017) supports the significance of AC independence to be 
segregated from the executive directors’ membership. Hence, 
as stipulated in Article (7) in JCGC (2017), the AC should 
consist of at least three non-executive directors which at least 
two of whom should be independent members and the 
committee should be head by one of them. The independent 
AC members are anticipated to be liable in circumventing the 
listed public companies in Jordan with the prospect to obtain 
a modified audit opinion. This research attempts to exam the 
effect of the independent of AC on the modified audit 
opinion. Therefore, the subsequent hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: There is a negative association between audit 
committee independence and the prospect that a company 
receives a modified audit opinion. 
2.3. Size of Audit Committee 
Recently, Buallay & AlDhaen, [22] claimed that a larger 
AC is the more efficient which is because of the fact that they 
consist of members with different knowledge and expertise to 
function more dependably in supervising financial processes. 
This is because a large number of AC members are more 
probably to assist a committee to uncover and resolve matters 
and problems in company reporting practices [55, 56, 22]. 
Besides, the more diverse, expertise, and competencies they 
are, the more assurance are their supervising roles and 
activities [55]. Therefore, ACs with more members can 
function better and more successfully as overseeing 
mechanism thereby averting the corporates from obtaining a 
modified audit opinion. 
The past study emphasizes that the size of the AC has a 
positive influence on the efficacy of the AC to supervise the 
quality of financial reporting [25, 56, 21]. This is due to the 
fact that when AC has satisfactory members with the various 
experience they tend to carry out more thorough supervision 
of financial statement because they have potential to offer an 
indispensable strength and variety of opinions and expertise 
to safeguard the effectual overseeing process of financial 
reporting [56-58]. This offer better strengthens the AC in 
their overseeing task, which, in turn, can result in a higher 
quality of financial statements [16, 7, 23], avert auditor’s 
incongruities with the management [59, 48, 60], and 
decreases the prospect of receiving a modified audit opinion. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between AC size and 
modified audit opinion is yet to be clear. Empirical 
researches showed conflicting results with respect to the 
influence of AC size on the quality of financial reporting. 
Some of these showed that the size of the AC has a 
substantial negative relationship with the quality of financial 
reporting [4, 9]. This suggests that the big size of AC would 
have superior control and overseeing role that has the 
potential to transform into a better quality of financial 
statements because of more participation and ideas. Whereas 
Salehi & Shirazi, [21] discovered that AC size is positively 
connected with the quality of financial disclosure of the firm. 
However, it has been stated that AC size has an insignificant 
relationship with quality of financial report [60, 16], and 
earnings management [19]. Furthermore, Pucheta-Martinez 
and De Fuentez [38] empirical study carried out in Spain 
claimed that the size of AC and the proportion of 
independent members significantly impact the reception of 
audit reports that comprise non-compliance or error qualities. 
The findings of these authors further showed a non-
significant relationship between the AC size and the issuing 
non-compliance or error practiced statements. 
With the aim of increasing the AC effectiveness, it must 
have a satisfactory number of committee members to execute 
its function. In the Jordanian context, the relationship 
between AC size and modified audit opinion still remains 
unclear. The JCGC (2017) obligate that AC must comprise of 
at least three directors. Thus, the literature indicates that AC 
size can be the auditor makes a key impact on the likelihood 
that modified opinion, however with an anticipated indication 
that this can be either positive or negative. This inspires the 
formulation of the second hypothesis as follow: 
H2: There is a relationship between the firms with a higher 
number of audit committee members which may less (more) 
likely to receive modified audit opinion. 
2.4. Meeting of Audit Committee 
According to earlier empirical evidence, the number of AC 
meetings mirrors their supervising efficiency [55, 22]. The 
number of meetings is the main component in the 
dependability and efficacy of a corporate’s undertakings and 
practices [22]. The number of meetings conducted by AC is 
directly associated with enhancements in the quality of 
financial reports [15, 16]. This is because more meetings held 
by the AC can boost their efficacy and provide more 
successful supervision for company financial statement [4], 
including planning and writing of firm financial activities. 
Consequently, the chance of receiving a modified audit 
opinion will be reduced [38, 15]. 
Conversely, the relationship between a number of AC 
meetings and modified audit opinion is yet to be clear. de 
Andrés Suárez et al. [15] discovered that the number of AC 
meetings significantly and positively affects the quality of the 
financial reports. This suggests that the number of AC 
meetings was linked with a lower prospect of modified 
opinions (greater quality of financial statement). Therefore, 
Sierra et al. [61] and García, Barbadillo & Pérez [4] stated 
that a negative relationship between the size and number of 
AC meetings and quality of financial statements as measured 
by discretionary accruals. Salehi & Shirazi, [21] show that 
the number of AC meetings held in the financial year is 
negatively linked with the quality of company disclosure. 
Likewise, Allegrini and Greco [62] displayed that the number 
of AC meetings is significantly connected with the quality of 
firm reporting. Pucheta-Martínez & De Fuentes, [38] 
established that AC in Spain is partly efficient in ensuring a 
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higher quality of the financial statement. De Vlaminck & 
Sarens [16] found a negative and insignificant relationship 
between AC meeting and the quality of financial reporting. In 
addition, Khlif and Samaha [8] depicted that AC meetings 
improve the internal mechanism. 
The relationship between AC meetings and modified audit 
opinion is still vague. In line with the JCGC (2017) which 
offers that, corporates must have their AC meetings with a 
minimum of four times a year (JCGC, 2017). Consequently, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: There is a negative association between the frequency 
of audit committee meetings and the prospect that a company 
receives a modified audit opinion. 
2.5. Expertise of Audit Committee 
A vital measurement for AC success, which attracted the 
consideration of supervisors and researchers, is the financial 
expertise of AC members. Fiscal expertise suggests that AC 
members should possess skill and experience in accounting and 
finance [7]. Consistent with the agency theory, the existence of 
members with fiscal expertise improves committee efficacy in 
executing monitoring responsibilities [63]. This is because AC 
members with experts in the discipline and have sufficient 
knowledge are more prospective in identifying irregular 
accounting and auditing performance compared to members 
who are lacking in these areas [64]. Bedard and Gendron [55] 
detailed that financial expertise permits AC members to classify 
and deliberate on the matter that tasks the managers and external 
auditors to a higher scope of the financial statement. This 
process is anticipated to increase the clarity and reliability of 
company reporting [22]. However, researches have exhibited 
that when the presence of members of the AC with proper 
experience is deemed a vital input to the efficacy of the AC, and 
thus, with an improved experience of the AC, can be more 
successful in monitoring the financial statement of the firm [55, 
20]. Hence, they appropriately monitor complex explicit 
accounting problems, can enhance the efficacy of the AC in 
supervising the practice of financial reporting [55, 64, 20, 16, 
17], and as a result, reducing the prospect of getting a modified 
audit opinion. 
Past studies indicate that the professional competence of 
the committee is an important element affecting the 
reliability of financial reports [65, 58, 51, 59]. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan [60] ascertained that the AC members with 
expertise in accounting and auditing are in a better position to 
oversee the quality of financial evidence. Cohen et al. [20] 
indicate that AC members with expertise can enhance AC 
efficacy in supervising the process of the financial statement, 
which the expectation to the corporate to decrease the obtain 
prospect of modified audit opinion [5]. However, Chen & 
Zhang, [51] and De Vlaminck & Sarens [16] ascertains the 
insignificant negative link between AC accounting expertise 
and quality of financial reports. Rainsbury et al. [66] 
establish no significant relationship between the AC’s 
expertise and quality of the financial report. In comparison, 
Chen & Komal [23] and Kusnadi et al. [9] disclosed that the 
quality of financial reporting is positively and significantly 
linked with the existence of accounting expertise in AC. 
Also, Hayes [53] and Badolato et al. [24] discover a positive 
relationship between financial expertise and the quality of the 
report. Kusnadi et al. [9] discern that ACs independence 
improves the quality of financial statement and that of 
committee with fraternized financial expertise inclines to be 
positively connected with financial reporting quality. DeFond 
& Francis [49] showed the positive market response to the 
choice of accounting financial experts consigned to AC, as it 
is considered that they can assist in enhancing the AC’s 
capability to ensure high-quality reporting. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between AC expertise and 
modified audit opinion remains unclear. Earlier studies have 
stressed the importance of the features of the AC as the critical 
factors in increasing AC efficacy in its supervising role in 
order to safeguard the quality of financial statement [55, 64, 20, 
51, 16, 22, 7, 23, 63]. This result in the conclusion that AC 
financial expertise appears to assume more effective 
monitoring activities improves committee efficacy in acting 
and overseeing responsibilities, and has more impact on the 
financial reporting, then consequently lessens the prospect of a 
corporate receipt of a modified audit opinion. 
In the Jordanian context, the JCGC (2017) necessitates all 
the AC members to be competence in financial and 
accounting affairs. Furthermore, at least one of whom should 
have preceding work experience in accounting or financial 
affairs or be a holder of a scientific requirement or a 
proficient certificate in accounting, finance, etc. Also, the 
code requires that all members of the AC should be skilled in 
reading, evaluating, and deducing financial information in 
order to accomplish their tasks efficiently. Debatably, the 
JCGC 2017 requires the AC members to have a sufficient 
cognizing of accounting affairs and matters linking with a 
financial statement. 
Consequently, it could be assumed that elevation of 
members in financial expertise will boost the AC’s capability 
to supervise the management [24], provide better supervision 
and to successfully analyze the practices [67], and guarantee 
the external auditor’s work efficiently embarks on [68], 
hence, would result in better internal control in the corporate 
and better quality of financial report [63]. Accordingly, there 
would be reduced in the occurrence of receipt of a modified 
audit opinion. Based on this rule coupled with the limited 
obtainable published work, this study tries to explore the 
influence of AC financial expertise on the modified audit 
opinion. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: There is a negative association between the audit 
committee expertise and the prospect that a company 
receives a modified audit opinion. 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
3.1. Sample Selection and Description 
The industry and services divisions are samples in this 
study. We select these sectors because industrial and service 
measured as a vital role for economic development [69], and 
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also due to the fact that numerous Jordanian corporates in 
these sectors have previously experienced bankruptcy 
following the corporate crises. This study uses data from 
2012 to 2017 after the issuance of the CG code of 2009 in 
Jordan. We selected these periods (i.e. 2012 to 2017) because 
the data are accessible and enough to achieve the purpose of 
this research [70]. We removed the financial sector from this 
sample, because of their distinctive features and their 
particular guidelines and requirements for annual reports. It 
is abiding by guidelines of governance published by the 
central bank and the insurance regulatory act, which vary 
from that of public shareholding corporates, which may have 
an influence on the results. The corporates with missing data 
were removed. The study samples comprised one hundred 
and seventeen (117) corporates that had the accessible data 
required for this research. The samples are firm-year 
observations from the 2012 to 2017 period. Data regarding 
AC and modified audit opinion were collected from the 
published annual reports for the listed corporates by the JSC. 
The audit opinion is applied as a measure for the quality of 
financial reporting. According to this data from the audit 
opinion reports of these corporates, most of these listed firms 
in Jordan received modified audit opinions from 2012 to 
2017 which match with the lower quality of financial 
reporting. 
The categories of modified audit opinion as received by 
Jordanian corporates during the period of 2012 to 2017 are 
presented in Table 1. The data are categorized into qualified 
(56%), unqualified with explanatory paragraph (42.66%), 
adverse opinion (0.44%), and disclaimer opinion (0.44%). 
Overall of 32.89% of the annual report of Jordanian 
corporates received a modified audit opinion between 2012 
to 2017 periods, which shows the lower quality of financial 
reporting from these Jordanian corporates. However, this is 
higher compared to Chinese listed corporates (11%), Britain 
(2.96%), and other East Asian economies (2.01%). 
Table 1. The Categories of Modified Audit opinion as Received by Jordanian Companies from 2012 to 2017. 
Type of Modified Audit Opinion 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total Percentage 
Qualified 19 19 22 24 24 19 127 56% 
unqualified with explanatory paragraph 14 18 18 15 14 17 96 42.66% 
adverse opinion 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.44% 
disclaimer opinion 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.44% 
Total 33 38 40 40 38 36 225 100% 
3.2. Model and Variables 
To achieve test this, we apply the following logistic regression models (algorithm model) for the probability that the external 
auditor can issue a modified audit opinion for the four hypotheses: 
MAO = β0 + β1 ACIND+ β2 ACSIZE+ β3 ACMEET+ β4 ACEXPE + β4 LogAuLag + β5 LogAF + β6 BIG4+ β7 LEV + β8 
LNASSETS + β9 Loss + β10 Prior Report + ε 
The variables measured in this model are described in Table 2. 




Modified Audit opinion MAO 1, if a company received a modified audit opinion, otherwise 0. 
AC independent ACIND the proportion of independent directors on the AC 
AC size ACSIZE Number of AC members 
AC meeting ACMEET Number of audit committee meetings held annually 
Financial Experience of Audit 
Committee Members 
ACEXPE 
The financial experience of the AC measured by dividing the number of qualified 
members in accounting financial and banking management by all members. 
Audit Report Lag ARLLN The logarithmic of audit report lag 
Audit Fees Audit Fees LN The logarithmic of external audit fees 
Audit Firm Size BIG4 Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 and 0 otherwise 
Leverage LEV The total liabilities divided by the total assets of firm i in year t 
Loss Loss 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm reported losses in the previous year, and 0 
otherwise 
Previous Audit Report AOPRIOR 
Dummy value (1 if the company received the same qualification in the previous and 
the current year; 0 otherwise) 
 
The major purpose of auditor work is to obtain practical 
guarantee as to whether the financial reporting, as a total, are 
devoid of document measurable misappropriation, so as the 
auditor is capable to express his/her opinion on the financial 
reporting without hindrance. The subsequent table (Table 3) 
explicates the reasons why the external auditor issued a modified 
audit opinion. According to ISA [71; 72], the external auditor 
issue a modified audit opinion because of three reasons; one, the 
inadequacy of the proper audit proof. Two, it is going concern 
opinion. Three, it is a mixture of reasons inadequacy of the 
proper audit-proof and going concern opinion. We discover that 
large portion of the corporates in Jordan gotten a modified audit 
opinion due to the inadequacy of the proper audit proof (also 
known as a drawback of the audit scope), which shows the 
lower quality of their financial statement. Therefore, a modified 
audit opinion can be a direct proxy for the quality of financial 
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reporting. Obtaining and detailing satisfactory proof on which to 
center the auditor’s opinion is one of the key purposes of an 
audit of financial reports. Approximately, 32.63% of corporates 
in Jordan received a modified audit opinion due to the going 
concern opinion emanating from the external auditor. About 
18.9% of corporate annual observation received a modified audit 
opinion as a result of both inadequate proof and going concern. 
Table 3. Reasons for Modified Audit opinions. 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total percentage 




10 12 13 15 11 16 77 34.22% 
Both 3 5 11 7 9 6 41 18.22% 
Total 33 38 40 40 38 36 225 100% 
4. Results and Discussion 
In Jordan, there is a growing interest in the external audit, 
as many of the business individuals in Jordan, irrespective of 
their legal type or size, are necessitate to have an external 
audit and to make their audited financial statements available 
to the people. Consequently, the findings of this provide 
detailed on the impact of ACCs on the modified auditor opinion 
in Jordan by exploring the relationship between the ACCs and 
the provision of the MAO among listed corporates in Jordan. In 
links with a research question, does the ACCs impact 
modified auditor opinion in Jordan? 
 
We employed descriptive statistics in this part to express 
variable used in this study. Table (4) displayed the mean of 
AC independent 0.30 ranges from 0 to 1. JCGC (2017) 
emphasizes the significance of AC that should encompass at 
least three non-executive directors, two of whom should be 
independent members and should head by one of them. The 
mean of AC size is approximately 3.18 and it ranges from 2 to 
7, and based on Jordanian code of CG, at least three members 
must be designated in the AC, this suggests that most of the 
corporates in Jordan followed (embraced) this regulation. 
Regarding the number of meetings, there should not less than 4 
meetings per annum according to JCGC, where the number of 
meetings obtained range between 1–13 meetings with 4.52 
mean. This suggests that most of the corporates in Jordan are 
obviously adopted this code. Further, AC financial expertise in 
accordance with JCGC (2017) necessitates at least one of AC 
members must have previous working experience with a 
background in accounting or financial matters or had a 
scientific qualification, or a professional certificate in 
accounting, finance, or other related areas. The mean of AC 
financial expertise is between 0–0.75, while the mean for 
member expertise is 0.23. This shows that most AC members 
in these corporates in Jordan have no appropriate experience 
required. The modified audit opinion score means is 0.23 
ranges between 0 and 1. This implies a lower quality of 
financial reporting these corporates in Jordan, which is greater 
compared to those of Chinese listed companies (11%), Britain 
(2.96%), and other East Asian economies (2.01%). 
Table 4. Sample Selection and Description. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Modified Audit 
opinion 
686 0.23 0.42 0 1 
ACIND 686 0.30 0.21 0 1 
ACSIZE 686 3.18 0.55 2 7 
AC meeting 686 4.52 1.14 1 13 
AC expertise 686 0.23 0.22 0 0.75 
Audit Report Lag LN 686 12.90 22.41 1.79 138 
Audit fees LN 686 9.26 0.87 1.50 11.99 
Big4 686 0.77 0.42 0 1 
leverage 686 66.53 356.46 0.01 4995.11 
LOSS 686 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Previous audit report 686 0.21 0.41 0 1 
4.1. Analysis of Logistic Regression Correlation Analysis 
(Pearson Correlation Matrix) for Variables 
The result of correlation analysis for variables is displayed 
in Table 5. According to Midi et al. [73], the common rule of 
thumb is that if the correlation coefficient between two 
regressors is greater than 0.8, the multicollinearity is a 
serious issue. The correlations are relatively low, mostly 
under 0.30 apart from the previous audit report, which is 
0.73% with 0.01% level of significant characterized by 
positive direction. This indicates that multicollinearity is not 
an issue in either of the model valuations. It implies that the 
corporates with previous audit report are more probable to 
obtain a modified audit opinion. The correlation-matrixes 
emphasize that the estimates of correlation realized for the 
variables in the modified audit opinion are less than 0.80. 
This suggests that there is nonexistence of multicollinearity 
among the descriptive variables in the models. The highest-
correlation among the independent variables is 0.31 for a 
modified audit opinion. All these variables have their 
correlation less than critical limits of 0.80 (Tables 5). This 
offers the suggestion that multicollinearity is not an issue in 
either of the model estimates. 
The Pearson coefficients of correlations between the 
dependent variable (Persistence) demonstrating the 
conservation or improvement in the unnecessary 
qualifications and the group of independent variables 
elucidates our hypotheses. Concerning the first hypothesis, 
the AC (independent variable) is positively correlated with 
our dependent variable. Also, we obtained an insignificant 
correlation between AC’s size or meeting (variables) and the 
dependent variable. The AC expertise is negatively correlated 
with the dependent variable. This finding agreed with our 
fourth hypothesis and seems to show that the AC with the 
expertise adds to the enhancement of the reliability of 
financial reporting, thereby decrease the corporate obtaining 
the modified audit opinion. 
 
 
 Journal of Finance and Accounting 2019; 7(3): 95-106 102 
 
Table 5. Result of Correlation Analysis for Variables (Pearson Correlation Matrix). 











          
ACIND 0.0634* 1 
         
ACSIZE 0.045 -0.0681* 1 
        
AC 
meeting 
0.0344 0.0372 0.2094*** 1 







      
ARL LN -0.0068 0.0271 -0.0595 -0.0863** 0.048 1 
     
Audit 
fees LN 
-0.0888** -0.0791** 0.1968*** 0.2503*** -0.0239 0.0348 1 
    
Big4 0.0096 -0.1249*** 0.0817** 0.0523 0.0451 0.0066 0.2431*** 1 
   
leverage 0.0181 0.050 -0.0071 0.0176 -0.0064 0.0223 -0.1988*** -0.2124*** 1 
  




0.737*** 0.0753** -0.0603 -0.0202 -0.0061 -0.0033 -0.0966** -0.0176 -0.0293 0.2489*** 1 
 
4.2. Logistic Regression Analysis 
Table 6 present the results of the logistic regression. The 
model contains independent variable AC (expertise, 
independence, meeting, and size) and control variables (audit 
report lag LN, audit fees LN, audit firm size, big4, Leverage, 
loss, and previous audit report) with modified audit report as 
the dependent variable. The result showed the Pseudo R2 
report at 50%, the Wald chi2 (10) test reports at 202.99 and 
the model is significant at 0.00 (p < 0.01) level. 
Table 6. Result of Logistic Regression. 
Modified audit opinion Coef. z P>z 
AC IND 0.423 0.49 0.628 
AC SIZE 0.587 2.70 0.007*** 
AC meeting 0.137 1.34 0.180 
AC expertise -1.378 -2.41 0.016** 
ARL LN 0.000 -0.05 0.957 
audit fees LN -0.156 -0.88 0.379 
Big4 0.531 1.74 0.082* 
Leverage 0.000 1.28 0.199 
LOSS 1.064 3.64 0.000*** 
Prior audit report 4.354 13.79 0.000*** 
_cons -4.516 -3.12 0.002*** 
Number of obs 686 
  
Wald chi2 (10) 202.99 
  
Prob > chi2 0.000 
  
Pseudo R2 0.5019 
  
With regards to a key variable, we noted that AC 
independence (AC IND) is not significantly related with 
modified audit opinion. These finding is not in agreement 
with our earlier anticipations as in hypothesis H1 and not in 
line with other earlier findings. De Vlaminck & Sarens [16] 
and Alzoubi [14] revealed a positive association between AC 
independence and quality of financial statement, whereas 
Chen & Zhang, [51] found a negative association between 
earnings management and the AC independence. Pucheta-
Martínez & de Fuentes [38] disclosed that AC independence 
has a significantly negative relationship at the 10% level with 
the reforms audit opinion for noncompliant with GAAP. 
Conversely, the finding also in concord with various other 
findings [54, 4, 15, 9] who as well fail to found any 
significant association between AC independence and quality 
of financial reporting. These findings indicated that AC 
independence has no influence on the quality of financial 
reporting. 
According to the results in Table 6, the size of AC has a 
significant effect on the modified audit opinion at 1% level. 
Nonetheless, the direction of effect is positive. This finding 
suggests that the size of AC is positively related to modified 
audit opinion. This is demonstrated that when the size of AC 
is increased, it may be harmful to the quality of financial 
reporting, which in turn, leads to increase in the prospect of 
corporates in Jordan to get the modified audit opinion. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis H1 is rejected. Further, this 
finding is in accordance with Kusnadi et al. [9] who reported 
a negative relationship between the size of AC and quality of 
financial reporting, exhibiting that increasing the size of AC 
can affect the quality of financial reporting. This finding 
controverted the result obtained by Pucheta-Martinez and de 
Fuentes [38] who found that the size of AC had an obvious 
influence on amended audit opinion. Likewise, Pucheta-
Martínez & García-Meca, [34] found no significant 
association between AC size and modified audit opinion. 
The number of AC meetings (AC meet) was not 
significantly related to MAO, thus hypothesis H3 rejected. 
This result is not consistent with initial anticipations in 
hypothesis H3 and controverted other reported findings. de 
Andrés Suárez et al. [15] showed that the number of AC 
meetings positively and significantly impacts the quality of 
the financial reporting, whereas García et al. [4] established a 
negative relationship between the AC size and number of 
meetings held by AC and quality of financial reporting. The 
finding supports the results obtained by Bédard et al. [58], 
Baxter & Cotter [74]), and García et al. [4] who did not 
substantiate any relationship between AC meeting and 
earning quality. During the stakeholders' meeting in Jordan, 
stockholders could be presented with a range of appropriate 
services and estimated costs. They then could adopt for 
themselves what level of the declaration they are willing to 
pay for every year. This would serve not only to inform 
stockholders of an audit's likely limitations but also to 
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educate them to the relative costs for augmented audit work 
that would result in increased levels of reassurance. 
Conversely, the General Meeting of Stakeholders is permitted 
to specify an index fee change. [15] offered proof that audit 
mandates in Jordan are frequently renewed. The author 
results indicated Jordanian Company Law necessitates that 
the annual general meeting takes place within six months 
after the closing of the fiscal year. Companies have to submit 
the financial statements to the Amman Security Exchange 
within thirty days after the annual general meeting of 
stakeholders. It is presumed that problem companies delay 
their annual general meeting, exceed the required compliance 
time of the financial statements, and thus are more probable 
to go bankrupt. 
Lastly, the association between AC financial expertise (AC 
exp) and modified audit opinion, which was negative and 
significant at 5% level, hence supported hypothesis H4. AC 
members with expertise, knowledge, and experience in 
accounting and finance (AC exp) will be more capable of 
correcting potential financial issues before they become 
bigger, this is due to the improved capability of AC members 
to ask and debate, and comprehend the solutions, then 
enhance the efficacy of the AC in supervising the process of 
financial reporting. Therefore, an AC with sufficient 
knowledge and skills in financial reporting has a higher 
tendency for decreasing the prospect of obtaining a modified 
audit opinion. This finding is in agreement with our initial 
anticipations in hypothesis H4, however, it opposes other 
earlier results obtained by Chen & Zhang [51] and De 
Vlaminck & Sarens, [16] who found no significant and 
negative association between AC accounting expertise and 
quality of financial reporting. Moreover, there are additional 
researches examine the relationship between AC financial 
expertise and managerial reporting quality in Jordan. [27] 
discovered a negative relationship between the existence of 
financial experts on AC and the occurrence of financial 
restatements in Jordan. [29] and [31] further indicated that 
AC financial expertise is positively connected with earnings 
quality in Jordan. [32] report a positive relationship between 
AC financial expertise and the quality of short-term 
disclosure. Comparison, [26] do not find a significant 
relationship between AC financial expertise and the quality 
of voluntary disclosure in Jordan. Financial expertise is 
considered fundamental to an AC’s effectiveness because the 
committee needs to conduct several responsibilities that 
require a high level of financial/accounting complexity [30, 
32]. Financial experts are therefore significant for achieving 
those responsibilities and protecting stakeholders’ interests in 
relation to financial reporting quality [25].  
With respect to control variables, we discovered that the 
audit report lag (ARL LN) displayed a positive but 
insignificant relationship with modified audit opinion. This 
mean shows that auditors spend more time and effort in their 
auditing duties before the issuance of a qualified opinion; this 
is concord with Tsipouridou & Spathis [75] and Sultana et al. 
[19]. The auditor needs to consider whether the matter 
causing the qualification and influencing the opinion on other 
matters indicated by the Companies Act in Jordan. If, the 
audit report represents the inventory balance or indeed 
related balances, for instance, costs of sales, working capital 
or net assets as itemized in the financial statements, then 
whereas it may be consistent with the financial core audit 
matters excluding matter termed in the basis for qualified 
opinion section, there are no main audit matters to be 
communicated in the report. The other information comprises 
the information included in the annual report, other than the 
financial statements and our auditor’s report thereon. The 
directors are responsible for the other information. Our 
opinion on the financial statements does not cover the other 
information and, except to the extent otherwise explicitly 
stated in our report, we do not express any form of assurance 
conclusion thereon. As highlighted by the findings, the long 
duration between the last of the financial year of a corporate 
and the date of the audit report increases the prospect of 
corporates in Jordan in receipt of a modified audit opinion. 
The External audit fees (audit fees LN) had an insignificant 
association with modified audit opinion. This result discloses 
that external audit fees have no effect in improving the 
supervising processes, the quality of financial reporting. This, 
therefore, influences the opportunity of obtaining an 
unmodified audit opinion by the listed corporates in Jordan. 
At the 10% level, the result showed a significant positive 
association between audit firm size (Big4) and the modified 
audit opinion. As expected, this result revealed that the audit 
firm size (Big4) improve the supervising process by 
improving the quality of financial statement thereby 
influence on the decline prospect of listed corporates in 
Jordan in obtaining a modified audit opinion. This result is 
not consistent with Moalla [12] and Farinha & Viana, [5] 
who could not found an existing relationship between audit 
report qualification or audit report reform and audit quality 
(Big-4/non-Big 4). The leverage (LEV) also has an 
insignificant association, this shows that the higher amount 
of leverage adds to the higher reception of modified audit 
report. This is in accordance with findings documented by 
studies [62, 16], although these results are did agreed with 
that of Moalla, [12] who found a positive association 
between leverage and audit report reform. 
LOSS is positively and strongly significant related with the 
modified audit opinion at 1% level, which indicates that these 
listed corporates in Jordan with a loss in the foregoing year 
increase their modified audit opinion. The finding is in 
agreement with the results reported by studies [76, 5, 77, 75, 
78, 12), who disclosed that corporates with accounting losses 
are more probable to obtain modified audit (unfavorable) 
opinions. It implies that modified audit opinion and loss have 
a relatively strong association with the supposition that loss 
has a crucial influence on the modified audit opinion. Earlier 
researches offered that there is a positive relationship 
between losses and the receiving of qualified audit statement 
[38, 79]. The previous year’s audit opinion (PRIORAR) 
variables showed positive and strongly significant with the 
modified audit opinion. Thus, these findings show that the 
probability of getting a modified audit opinion is positively 
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related to companies that obtained a similar qualification in 
the earlier year as the present year. This is in line with results 
from Pucheta-Martínez et al. [35] and Pucheta-Martínez & 
De Fuentes [38] who stated that there is a positive association 
between the previous year’s audit opinion and modified audit 
opinion. 
5. Conclusion 
This work explores the relationship between the modified 
audit opinion and the internal company supervising 
mechanisms including the AC characteristics (independence, 
financial expertise, meetings, and size) in public listed 
corporates in Jordan. The ACs are bestowed with the 
capability to oversee the process of financial reporting 
thereby directly influence the quality of financial reporting, 
in turn, leads to decreasing prospect of Jordanian corporates 
in obtaining a modified audit opinion. 
The findings of this study showed that AC independence 
and number of meetings were not significantly related to the 
modified audit opinion. However, this study found proof that 
in line with the role of the AC size and financial expertise of 
the AC in decreasing the prospect of Jordanian public listed 
companies in obtaining a modified audit opinion. This shows 
that the corporates with large AC size and AC members with 
superior expertise and knowledge in the field of accounting 
and auditing are more probably to obtain an unmodified audit 
opinion. 
The audit markets and production are not covered. These 
are the major limitation of this study especially in the 
connection with MAO and financial reporting. The external 
audit fees had an insignificant association with modified 
audit opinion. This result discloses that external audit fees 
have no effect in improving the supervising processes, the 
quality of financial reporting. This, therefore, influences the 
opportunity of obtaining an unmodified audit opinion by the 
listed corporates in Jordan. 
Based on these limitations, this study suggests that future 
studies should look at AC financial expertise on the MAO by 
extending it to include audit markets and production. In a 
situation when the auditor’s opinion is qualified, attention 
should be given to whether the other facts are also influenced 
by the similar matter as, or a related matter to, the matter-
giving rise to the qualified opinion on the financial statements. 
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